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1. Introduction 
 
As a result of recent challenging economic circumstances, many individual and 
regional economies have emphasised the importance of indigenous industry ‘moving up the 
value chain’ or entering the ‘smart economy’ by producing goods and services requiring 
higher skills and a greater ability to absorb technological advances developed elsewhere. The 
Lisbon Strategy and the Europe 2020 Strategy, for example, aim to encourage innovation in 
the EU, while Joint Ventures can benefit from a ‘block exemption’ from EU competition law. 
Innovation can suffer from the public good problem as knowledge of a firm’s 
innovation processes and results may ‘spill over’ to its rivals, reducing the private incentive to 
undertake research and development (R&D), as no innovator can fully appropriate the benefits 
of its innovation. Other problems are that the outcome of any innovation process may be 
uncertain and/or the financial investment required may be relatively large. Also, innovating 
firms may duplicate the innovation efforts of its rivals, which is socially wasteful. 
Classic examples of public solutions to the private innovation problem are the 
introduction of patents and R&D subsidies. One private solution is for innovators to co-
operate in R&D by forming a Research Joint Venture (RJV), where innovation is undertaken 
to maximise the sum of joint profits of all RJV members. Also, innovators can decide on the 
level of information sharing within the RJV, so that effective spillover levels become 
endogenous, and can also co-ordinate their innovation efforts to avoid any duplication.  
One possible problem is that co-operation at the innovation stage may be extended, 
implicitly, to the final output market, increasing the market power of the RJV members. 
Another issue is that RJV’s may be formed by a subset of firms to attain, or increase, a 
competitive advantage over other firms, possibly inducing the exit of non-RJV firms and 
increasing the market power of RJV firms. RJV’s may also be formed to prevent entry into an 
industry in order to maintain or increase existing levels of market power that would be reduced 
in the absence of RJV formation. This may be beneficial in terms of greater consumer welfare 
if increased innovation reduces marginal production costs and, consequently, final output 
prices. On the other hand, this may be a temporary outcome as prices may increase if non-RJV 
firms are forced to exit the industry or potential entrants are faced with greater barriers to 
entry. In looking at the desirability of RJV formation, therefore, any regulatory authority must 
compare any possible pro and anti-competitive effects.  
While firms can undertake R&D in order to improve the quality of their product 
(product innovation) or reduce marginal production costs (process innovation), this paper 
focuses on the latter. In general, the existing literature is favourable towards such ventures, as 
they can lead to greater incentives to undertake R&D, greater total industry profits and, 
possibly, greater welfare. A seminal contribution to the literature on RJV formation in the 
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presence of exogenous R&D spillovers is D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), where firms 
can compete in R&D, by choosing their R&D levels to maximise own profits, or co-operate in 
R&D (form a RJV), where each firm chooses its R&D to maximise the sum of joint profits.
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Irrespective of what happens at the R&D stage, firms cannot co-operate in the output market, 
in accordance with antitrust regulations.  
From the firms’ perspective, RJV formation is weakly preferred to R&D competition.2 
From a welfare perspective, the desirability of RJV formation depends on whether output is 
exported in its entirety or consumed domestically. In the former, RJV formation is weakly 
welfare-enhancing for all spillovers.
3
 In the latter, RJV formation should only be encouraged if 
spillover levels are relatively high. At relatively low spillovers, higher R&D investment under 
R&D competition leads to higher consumer welfare and this dominates the higher profits 
under RJV formation. Conversely, when spillovers are relatively high, RJV formation induces 
lower prices and higher profits so that welfare is higher.
4
  
An important point to note in the D’Aspremont and Jacquemin model is that even in 
the case of RJV formation, effective spillovers remain exogenous. Poyago-Theotoky (1999) 
showed that firms will wish to fully share information when forming a RJV. Kamien, Muller 
and Zang (1992) conclude that RJV cartelisation is most desirable as R&D investment and 
profits are highest, while output prices are lowest.
5
 One characteristic that is shared by all of 
these papers is that firms simultaneously undertake their R&D investment.  
A number of papers examine the empirical evidence regarding RJV formation. Among 
these, Hernan, Marin and Siotis (2003) look at European data and find that industry 
concentration, firm size, technological spillovers and R&D intensity increase the likelihood of 
forming a RJV while patent effectiveness reduces it, concluding that “…knowledge diffusion 
is central to our understanding of RJV formation”.6 Roller, Tombak and Siebert (2007) analyse 
US data and find that firms that are similar in size, have already participated in other RJV’s 
and produce complementary products are more likely to form RJV’s.7  
                                                 
1
 Earlier related papers include Dasgupta & Stiglitz (1980), Katz (1986) and Spence (1988). Several 
papers extend the D’Aspremont & Jacquemin framework without fundamentally adding to their 
analysis. Such papers include Suzumura (1992), Vonortas (1994), Ziss (1995) and Steurs (1995). For a 
general overview of the relationship between spillovers and innovation, see De Bondt (1996). 
2
 RJV profits are always greater, except for spillovers of ½ when the two cases are identical. 
3
 As there are no consumer welfare considerations, welfare is measured by total industry profits This 
point was noted by, among others, Neary and O’Sullivan (1999).  
4
 A similar point was made by Motta (1992) in the context of a vertical product differentiation model 
where firms engage in product innovation. In this case, the threshold spillover was not identical due to 
a different demand specification.  
5
 KMZ define a RJV as a situation where firms fully share information between themselves, while 
cartelisation refers to when the firms choose their R&D investment in order to maximise joint profits. 
6
 R. Hernan, P. Marin & G. Siotis, 2003, ‘An empirical evaluation of the determinants of research joint 
venture formation’, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 51 (1), p87. 
7
 The authors also provide theoretical evidence that large firms will not form RJV’s with smaller firms. 
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The other relevant theoretical literature strand is that of market leadership in the 
presence of uncertain demand. Several papers have analysed the effects of a firm having a 
first-mover advantage, either as an incumbent monopolist (e.g. Dixit (1980)), or as a duopolist 
(e.g. Spencer & Brander (1992)). Many of these papers focus on the case of output leadership, 
but also extend their models to ‘capacity’ leadership, where capacity can be interpreted as, for 
example, production facilities, advertising or R&D investment. 
Spencer and Brander (1992) looks at where one firm in a duopoly has an exogenously 
given first-mover opportunity and constant marginal production costs depend on a firm’s 
‘capacity’ level. The issue facing a ‘leader’ was whether to ‘commit’ to choosing its output or 
capacity before any uncertainty is resolved, or to remain ‘flexible’ and choose it after the true 
level of demand is realised. A leader ‘commits’ if demand volatility is sufficiently low and 
remains flexible otherwise. On the other hand, if both firms could choose to commit, the Nash 
equilibrium is where both firms either commit or remain flexible, with the equilibrium 
outcome depending on the volatility of the demand shock. For a range of variance values, 
there are multiple Nash equilibria. 
Spencer and Brander expand the Dixit framework to the case of uncertainty about the 
‘follower’s’ costs, where the firms’ marginal production costs are increasing in output. This 
framework allowed for entry to be unprofitable under a number of different circumstances. 
Entry is ‘blockaded’ if it is never profitable even if both firms are flexible and the demand 
shock is at its maximum. Entry is ‘actively prevented’ if it is unprofitable when the leader 
commits some capital, but would be profitable for the maximum value of the demand shock if 
both firms are flexible. Another possibility is that entry is profitable for the lowest value of the 
shock when the leader commits its capital, so that the leader may ‘manipulate’ entry by over-
investing in capital when committing or by remaining flexible. Finally, the leader may engage 
in ‘probabilistic entry deterrence’ whereby the higher its committed capital, the more likely it 
will be that entry is deterred as the greater must be the realised value of any shock to make 
entry profitable. Though the Spencer and Brander paper is useful in looking at firms’ 
incentives in the face of uncertainty, there are no spillovers in ‘capacity’ choice, the firms’ 
marginal production costs are increasing in output and linear in capacity costs, while the firms 
never ‘co-operate’ in capacity investment if they remain flexible.  
Rossell and Walker (1999), using the D’Aspremont & Jacquemin framework, look at 
the effect of incumbent R&D leadership in the presence of potential entry when there are R&D 
spillovers. While noting the standard outcomes of blockaded entry, entry accommodation and 
entry deterrence, they also argue that for relatively high spillovers, the incumbent may, 
depending on fixed entry costs, choose its R&D in order to solicit entry into the industry. In 
particular, the higher are fixed costs, the more likely it is that entry will be blockaded, though 
the incumbent will prefer accommodation to benefit from relatively high spillovers. In this 
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case, the incumbent may choose some R&D level that makes entry profitable. The lower are 
fixed costs, the more likely it is that the leader will choose to accommodate the entrant. In this 
paper, however, there is no co-operative behaviour, nor is there any welfare analysis. 
Maggi (1996) finds that even if firms are ex-ante identical and have identical entry 
opportunities, an asymmetric equilibrium occurs where one firm chooses to commit to capital 
investment while the other remains flexible. Again, there are no spillovers in capacity 
investment, nor do firms co-operate in capacity choice. 
Dewit and Leahy (2006) extends the literature further and allows for a lag between 
when firms commit to investing in capital and when such investment actually occurs. The 
situation where firms simultaneously commit to, and invest in, their capital investment is 
referred to as ‘action commitment’, with the case where firms choose the timing of their 
investment, but not the capital level, denoted as ‘observable delay’. For the purposes of this 
paper, it is the former case that is relevant. 
In the ‘action commitment’ case, the equilibrium outcome depends on the 
effectiveness of R&D (related to the inverse of unit R&D costs) and the volatility of the 
demand shock. Depending on these values, the firms may either invest simultaneously or one 
firm is a leader. In some cases, there may be multiple equilibria. The lower the volatility of 
demand, the more likely it is that both firms will commit to investing in capital. At relatively 
high volatility levels, both remaining flexible becomes more likely to be the equilibrium 
outcome. At intermediate levels, a sequential investment equilibrium is likely. As with 
Spencer & Brander, however, Dewit and Leahy assume that there are no spillovers in capacity 
choice and there is no co-operative behaviour by the firms. 
This paper, therefore, seeks to bring together a number of strands in the industrial 
organisation literature by complementing some of the papers referred to above in order to 
attain a greater insight into the incentives for firms to form Research Joint Ventures. While 
the incentive to form a RJV when firms simultaneously choose their R&D levels under 
certain demand conditions is well-known, this paper seeks to determine whether, 
under uncertain demand conditions, a R&D ‘leader’ will wish to form a RJV with a 
‘follower’. In particular, issues of RJV formation, strategic entry accommodation, strategic 
entry deterrence and investment under uncertainty are analysed.   
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 
looks at where both firms either ‘jump’ or ‘wait’ and simultaneously undertake their R&D 
investment. In Section 4, R&D levels are chosen sequentially but the ‘leader’ accommodates 
the follower. In Section 5, the simultaneous and sequential R&D games of Sections 3 & 4 are 
compared. Section 6 looks at where a ‘leader’ now seeks to prevent activity by the follower 
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either for certain or in expectation. Section 7 compares the cases of accommodation and 
activity prevention by simulating the models of the previous sections. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
 
 This paper looks at the incentives of risk-neutral profit maximising firms to form a 
RJV when the firms may sequentially undertake their R&D investments due to uncertainty 
about the true level of demand. The uncertainty is assumed to be resolved before the firms 
simultaneously choose their profit maximising output levels. The issue facing each firm is 
whether to ‘wait’ and delay its R&D investment until after the uncertainty is resolved, or to 
‘jump’ and invest before the true demand level is known and possibly be a R&D leader. The 
interesting question is whether a ‘leader’ will wish to form a RJV with a ‘follower’. 
Alternatively, a ‘leader’ may prevent a ‘follower’ from becoming active in the industry.  
The model is a one-shot game where two symmetric output-setting firms that produce 
an homogenous good undertake process R&D. Each firm incurs the direct cost of R&D 
investment and also receives an exogenous R&D spillover from its rival, the effect of which is 
to reduce own marginal production costs. To comply with antitrust regulations, the firms 
always remain rivals in the output market. All production takes place in one economy, while 
output may be consumed domestically or exported in its entirety to another economy.  
It is assumed that both firms have costlessly entered the industry by, say, obtaining a 
licence from the government or a regulatory authority. If one firms ‘jumps’ and becomes a 
leader, the issue is whether, through its R&D choice, it will accommodate the follower or 
prevent it from becoming active in the industry.
 8,
 
9
 If the leader accommodates the follower, 
the firms may either compete in R&D, by choosing their R&D investment to maximise own 
profits, or co-operate in R&D (form RJV) by investing in R&D to maximise joint profits. 
Alternatively, if the leader seeks to prevent the follower from becoming ‘active’, there are two 
possible cases. Firstly, certain activity prevention where a leader chooses its R&D to ensure 
that the producing output is never profitable for the follower for any level of demand and the 
leader is always an output market monopolist. On the other hand, expected activity prevention 
is where a leader chooses its R&D to ensure that activity is expected to be unprofitable for the 
follower, given the expected value of demand, so that the leader may be an output market 
monopolist depending on the realised value of demand. In both cases, the leader competes in 
                                                 
8
 Intuitively, the latter is equivalent to entry deterrence in the absence of fixed costs. This paper’s 
‘activity prevention’ differs from Spencer & Brander’s ‘actively prevented entry’ where entry was 
unprofitable if the leader committed some capital, but profitable for the highest value of the demand 
shock when both firms were flexible.  
9
 While the main focus of this paper is on RJV formation, the issue of activity prevention is analysed 
given the possible sequential move order.  
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R&D with the follower. If both firms ‘jump’ or ‘wait’, it is assumed that R&D levels are 
chosen simultaneously, while if a firm decides to ‘wait’, it may be a follower in R&D. 
When firms simultaneously choose their R&D levels, there are four stages to the 
game. If both firms ‘wait’, then in the first stage, the demand uncertainty is resolved. 
Secondly, the firms decide whether or not to commit to forming a RJV. In the third stage, the 
firms choose their R&D levels, while in the final stage the firms choose their output levels. On 
the other hand, if both firms ‘jump’, the demand uncertainty is resolved after the firms choose 
their R&D levels, but before the output stage. 
If the firms sequentially choose their R&D levels, the number of stages will depend on 
whether the leader accommodates the follower or prevents it from becoming active, either for 
certain or in expectation. Under accommodation, there are five stages. In the first stage, the 
firms decide whether or not to form a RJV. Secondly, the leader chooses its R&D. The 
demand uncertainty is then resolved followed by the follower choosing its R&D level. Finally, 
the firms choose their output levels. 
If, on the other hand, the leader seeks to prevent the follower from becoming active, 
the number of stages depends on whether the leader does so for certain or in expectation. In 
the former case, there are three stages with the leader’s R&D choice in the first stage being 
followed by the true demand level being revealed. Finally, as the follower decides not to 
become active, the leader chooses its monopoly output level. In the latter case, there may be 
three or four stages depending on the level of demand. The first two stages are as in the certain 
prevention case. In the third stage, if activity is profitable, the follower chooses its R&D level 
and this is followed by both firms choosing their output levels. If, however, activity is not 
profitable, the leader chooses its monopoly output level in the third stage. 
The firms are assumed to face the linear inverse demand function 
p(Q,u) = a – bQ + u   (1) 
where Q = q + q* is total industry output and  uuu ,   is a uniformly distributed demand 
shock with an expected value of zero and a variance of 2.10, 11 Given E(u) = 0, the variance of 
the demand shock is 
3
u
du)u(fu)u(E
2
u
u
222   . 
Marginal production costs are a linear function of own and rival R&D and are 
 c(x,x*) = A – (x + x*) ≥ 0 and c*(x,x*) = A – *(*x + x*) ≥ 0  (2) 
for the respective firms, where , * ≥ 0 denote the effectiveness of R&D in reducing 
marginal production costs and 0  , *  1 are exogenous R&D spillover parameters. Given 
this,  and ** are the effective spillovers of the firms. It is assumed that uaA 0  to 
                                                 
10
 This is identical to the set-up of Spencer and Brander (1992) and Dewit and Leahy (2006). 
11
 In what follows, the non-representative firm is denoted by *. 
 8 
ensure positive outputs, irrespective of the magnitude of the demand shock. R&D costs are 
convex in R&D, thereby exhibiting diminishing returns to R&D, and are given by (x) = x2/2 
and (x*) = x*2/2 for the respective firms, where  > 0 is a measure of unit R&D costs. 
The profit of the representative firm is 
 
2
*)(*)()),((*),(
2x
qxxAubqbqaxqcuQpqq

   (3) 
Welfare is defined to be the sum of consumer surplus and total industry profits:  
*
2
bQ
)Q(W
2
       (4) 
where the first term on the right hand side of (4) is a measure of consumer surplus from (1).  
In what follows, N denotes R&D competition, C denotes RJV formation (R&D co-
operation) and D denotes activity prevention.
12
 Also, U refers to the stage at which the 
uncertainty is resolved, R denotes an R&D stage and O denotes the output stage. These letters 
will denote the various games played by the firms. For example, RUROC is the case where the 
‘leader’s’ R&D (R) occurs before the uncertainty (U) is resolved, after which the follower’s 
R&D (R) is then chosen before the output stage (O) while the firms form a RJV (C).
13
 
 
3. Simultaneous R&D Investment 
 
There are two possible scenarios in which the firms simultaneously choose their R&D 
levels. Both firms can ‘wait’ until the uncertainty is resolved or ‘jump’ and undertake their 
R&D before the true demand level is known. Irrespective of what the firms do, the output 
stage is unchanged as the true demand is known and the firms always compete in output. 
Maximising (3) with respect to the representative firm’s output, and doing likewise for 
the other firm, implies that ex-post output levels are given by  














*)*2()**2()(
**)2(*)*2()(
3
1
* xxu
xxu
bq
q


 (5) 
where Aa  . 
 
 3.1 Post-uncertainty investment (both ‘wait’)   (URON & UROC) 
 
3.1.1 R&D competition  (URON) 
 
                                                 
12
 It is assumed that accommodation is the default case, so that prevention/deterrence is denoted by D. 
13
 Similarly, URON refers to where firms compete in R&D and ‘wait’ until the uncertainty is resolved, 
while RUOC is where the firms form a RJV and undertake their R&D before the demand shock occurs. 
 9 
 Each firm chooses its R&D in order to maximise its own profits so that the 
representative firm’s first-order R&D condition is 

0
*
*
effect
strategic
effect
direct










 x
q
qxdx
d 
    (6) 
The direct effect of R&D is the marginal benefit of R&D, the reduction in variable production 
costs, less the marginal R&D cost. As the firms are output market rivals, there may be 
strategic considerations to each firm’s R&D investment. Using (1), (2), (3) and (5) in (6), the 
representative firm over (under) invests in R&D when ** < (>) /2. 14 If the effective 
spillover to its rival is sufficiently low, each firm over-invests in R&D to profit-shift from its 
rival as R&D is a strategic substitute. Conversely, if spillovers are sufficiently high, R&D is a 
strategic complement and each firm ‘free-rides’ on its rival’s R&D by under-investing in 
R&D.
15
 Ex-post symmetry implies that  = * and  = * and the firms over (under) invest in 
R&D when  < (>) ½.16  
Given (5) and (6), profit maximising R&D levels are 
)1)(2(29
)2)((2
*
2 




b
u
xx NN   (7) 
that decrease in the effective spillover and increase in the demand shock.
17 
As spillovers 
increase, a firm increasingly benefits from its rival’s R&D and this reduces each firm’s 
incentive to undertake R&D. Given E(u) = 0, the expected R&D of the firms is 
   
)1)(2(29
)2(2
*
2 




b
xExE NN   (8) 
Ex-post profit maximising R&D levels are greater (lower) than expected levels when the 
actual shock is positive (negative). As the expected marginal private return to R&D per unit of 
output is identical to the actual return, the firms expect to over (under) invest in R&D when  
< (>) ½. Substituting (7) into (5) to solve for output levels, using these in (3) and given E(u
2
) = 
2, expected profits are 
 
 
0
)1)(2(29
)2(29)(
)*()(
22
2222







b
b
EE NN   (9) 
which are positively related to the variance of the demand shock,
18
 while expected welfare is 
                                                 
14
 Over (under) investment occurs when, in the first stage, firms undertake R&D investment where the 
marginal private benefit of R&D is less (greater) than the marginal private cost. This may not be profit 
maximising at the R&D stage but leads to higher output market profits in the second stage, thereby 
increasing total profit. 
15
 A firm’s R&D is a strategic substitute (complement) for its rival’s R&D when an increase in its 
R&D investment reduces (increases) the marginal profitability of its rival’s R&D. If R&D is a strategic 
substitute (complement), R&D reaction functions are downward (upward) sloping in R&D space. 
16
 This is consistent with D’Aspremont & Jacquemin where  = * = 1. 
17
 Each firm’s second-order R&D condition requires 9b - 22(2-)2 > 0. To ensure analysis for all 
spillover levels, this implies that b is large enough to satisfy 9b - 22(2-)(1+) > 0. 
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 
 22
2222
)1)(2(29
)2(218)(2
)(





b
b
WE N   (10) 
which is also positively related to the volatility of the demand shock. 
 
  3.1.2 RJV formation (R&D co-operation)  (UROC) 
  
The firms now choose their R&D to maximise the sum of joint profits so that the 
representative firm’s first-order R&D condition is now 
0
***
*
*)(
































x
q
qxx
q
qxdx
d 
 (11) 
The direct marginal benefit of R&D is now the reduction in variable production costs of all 
RJV members. Using (1), (2), (3) and (5) in (11), the representative firm over (under) invests 
in R&D if ** < (>) -, so that the firm under-invests in R&D for any R&D spillover.19 Ex-
post symmetry implies  = * and  = * so that, given (5) and (11), R&D levels are 
22 )1(29
)1)((2
*





b
u
xx CC    (12) 
where R&D is now increasing in the effective spillover, given strategic complementarity of 
R&D.
20
 Given E(u) = 0, expected R&D levels are 
   
22 )1(29
)1(2
*





b
xExE CC   (13) 
and the firms expect to under-invest in R&D for all effective spillovers. Substituting (12) into 
(5), using these in (3) and given E(u
2
) = 2, expected profits are  
0
)1(29
)(
)*()(
22
22







b
EE CC   (14) 
which are positively related to demand volatility, while expected welfare is 
 
 222
2222
)1(29
)1(218)(2
)(





b
b
WE C   (15) 
 
3.1.3 R&D competition v RJV formation  (URON v UROC) 
 
 Comparing expected R&D levels in (8) and (13), 
                                                                                                                                            
18
 The positive relationship between expected profits and the volatility of the demand shock is a 
standard result in the literature. See, among others, Spencer & Brander (1992). 
19
 There will be some degree of strategic R&D investment given the firms’ output market rivalry. As 
R&D is a strategic complement at all spillovers, the firms ‘free-ride’ on the R&D of their RJV partner. 
20
 Each firm’s second-order R&D condition requires 9b - 22(1+)2 > 0. 
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When  < ½ the profit shifting effect of R&D competition dominates the spillover 
internalisation effect of RJV formation and competitive R&D levels are higher. Conversely, 
when  > ½, the reverse holds and RJV levels are higher. 
Comparing expected profit levels in (9) and (14), 
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so that the firms expect a RJV to be at least as profitable as R&D competition. An interesting 
finding from (9) and (14) is that changes in the volatility of demand have a greater effect on 
RJV profits for all effective spillovers, except when  = ½ where the effect is identical. When 
the firms form a RJV, the variance of the demand shock has a positive effect on both own and 
RJV partner profits. When  = ½, R&D is neither a strategic substitute nor complement so that 
only own profits are affected by demand volatility. 
Comparing expected welfare levels in (10) and (15), the second-order conditions 
ensure that 
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so that a RJV is expected to reduce (increase) welfare relative to the competitive R&D case 
when  < (>) ½. For sufficiently low spillovers, the higher R&D of the competitive R&D case 
leads to higher output and lower prices so that the higher consumer surplus dominates the 
higher profits of the RJV case. As spillovers increase, the higher R&D of the RJV case 
combined with higher profits leads to greater welfare levels. 
 
3.2 Pre-uncertainty investment (both ‘jump’)  (RUON & RUOC) 
 
 This is also a three-stage game, though R&D investment is now chosen to maximise 
expected profits as it occurs before the demand uncertainty is resolved. As the firms remain 
output market rivals, ex-post output expressions are again given by (5).
21
   
 
  3.2.1 R&D competition (RUON) 
 
 As the firms are risk-neutral, the representative firm’s first-order R&D condition is 
                                                 
21
 In what follows, the subscript ‘u’ denotes that this is a game in which at least one firm undertakes its 
R&D investment before the demand uncertainty is resolved. 
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Ex-post symmetry implies  = * and  = * so that given (1), (2) and (5), (19) can be 
expressed as 
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where u
N
 is the marginal private return to R&D per unit of output. Non-strategic R&D 
investment requires u
N
 =  so the firms expect to over (under) invest in R&D when  < (>) ½. 
Given (5), (20) and E(u) = 0, R&D levels are 
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which are identical to those in (8), given the assumption of risk-neutrality and E(u) = 0.
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To solve for expected profits levels, use (3), (5), (21) and E(u
2
) = 2 to derive 
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which is positively related to the volatility of the demand shock, though the effect differs from 
when both firms wait as R&D levels are not now directly affected by the demand shock. From 
(4), (5), (21) and (22), expected welfare is 
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which is also positively related to the volatility of the demand shock. 
 
  3.2.2 RJV formation (R&D co-operation) (RUOC) 
 
 The representative firm’s first-order R&D condition is now  
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 Ex-post non-strategic R&D levels are 
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. If  = ½, then, ex-post, the firms over (under) invest in R&D if 
the demand shock is negative (positive), though, ex-ante, they expect to invest non-strategically, given 
E(u) = 0. When  < ½, the firms, ex-post, over-invest in R&D, except if there are relatively large, 
positive demand shocks. On the other hand, when  > ½, the firms, ex-post, under-invest in R&D, 
except if there are relatively large, negative demand shocks. When  < (>) ½ and the shock is 
sufficiently positive (negative), ex-post non-strategic R&D is relatively high (low) and, as each firm’s 
investment is based on a zero shock, the firms will be under (over) investing in R&D. This contrasts 
with the certain demand case where the firms always over (under) invest in R&D when  < (>) ½. 
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Ex-post symmetry again implies  = * and  = * so that, given (1), (2) and (5), (24) can be 
expressed as 
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where u
C
 is the marginal RJV return to R&D per unit of output. Non-strategic R&D 
investment requires )1`(  Cu , so the firms expect to under-invest in R&D for all 
spillovers.
23
 From (5) and (25), expected-profit maximising R&D levels are 
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which are identical to those in (13).
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From (3), (5) and (26), and given E(u
2
) = 2, expected profits are 
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where the effect of greater demand volatility is again positive. From (4), (5), (26) and (27), 
expected welfare is 
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which, again, is positively related to the volatility of the demand shock. 
 
  3.2.3 R&D competition v RJV formation  (RUON V RUOC) 
 
Looking first at R&D levels in (21) and (26), 
2
1
  when


























Cu
N
u xx     (29) 
which is identical to when both firms ‘wait’ in (16).25 Comparing expected profit levels in (22) 
and (27), 
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 Given joint profit maximisation, non-strategic R&D investment occurs where each firm invests in 
R&D to where the marginal RJV return to R&D (equal to the sum of private returns) equals the 
marginal RJV cost (equal to marginal private R&D cost).  
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 Ex-post non-strategic R&D levels are 
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. Ex-post, the firms over-invest in R&D for relatively large 
negative demand shocks, and under-invest for all non-negative and relatively low negative shocks. For 
relatively large negative demand shocks, ex-post non-strategic R&D is relatively low. The firms’ R&D 
decisions, however, are based on a zero demand shock so that, ex-post, the firms may over-invest in 
R&D. Again, this contrasts with the certain demand case where the firms always under-invest in R&D. 
25
 The intuition for this in given in Section 3.1.3. 
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so that a RJV is again expected to be at least as profitable as R&D competition.  
Interestingly, the effect of the variance of the demand shock on expected profits is 
identical in both the competitive and co-operative R&D cases. This is due to the fact that the 
firms’ R&D levels are not directly affected by the true demand shock as they are chosen 
before the shock is known. Only output levels are directly affected by the shock and as, from 
(5) and ex-post symmetry, this effect is identical for each firm, demand volatility has an equal 
effect on expected profits in both cases.
26
 
 Comparing expected welfare levels in (23) and (28), stability conditions imply that  
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so that, again, a RJV is expected to be welfare reducing (increasing) relative to competitive 
R&D when  < (>) ½. 
 
4. Sequential R&D: Accommodation 
 
 This section looks at where one firm undertakes its R&D investment before the other 
firm invests in its R&D and the demand uncertainty is resolved. When choosing its R&D, the 
leader maximises expected own or joint profits subject to the R&D reaction function of the 
follower by investing at the ‘Stackelberg’ point in R&D space. Ex-ante, the leader expects the 
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 We can derive ex-post profits and show that 
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u  . As R&D levels are identical 
when  = ½, so too are ex-post profits, irrespective of the demand shock. When  < (>) ½, profits in the 
RJV (competitive R&D) case are higher if the demand shock is non-positive (non-negative), while for 
positive (negative) shocks, which profit level dominates will depend on the levels of spillovers, the 
demand shock, the extent of demand relative to exogenous marginal cost (), and on the relative 
ineffectiveness of R&D (b For example, when  < ½, competitive R&D levels exceed RJV levels. 
When the shock is negative, the firms over-invest in R&D if they compete in R&D and under (over) 
invest in R&D when the shock is relatively low (high) if they form a RJV. For relatively large positive 
shocks, the competitive R&D firms will invest in R&D relatively efficiently, while the co-operative 
firms will under-invest to a relatively large degree. The effect is to reduce the competitive firms’ 
marginal production costs to a degree that is not offset by higher R&D costs so profits are increased 
relative to when the firms form a RJV. On the other hand, a relatively low positive shock implies that 
RJV profits are higher as the benefit of lower R&D costs dominates any disadvantage in relation to 
lower marginal production costs. The opposite can be shown when  > ½ and R&D is greater when the 
firms co-operate in R&D. The interesting point is that compared to the certain demand case, 
competitive R&D profits may exceed RJV profits, ex-post, over a range of positive (negative) demand 
shocks when  < (>) ½. This contradicts the D’Aspremont and Jacquemin result that RJV formation is 
at least as profitable as R&D competition, though this is what the firms expect ex-ante. 
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follower’s R&D reaction function to be in a position consistent with a zero demand shock. For 
the follower, however, a non-zero demand shock will, relative to the leader’s expectation, 
change its best R&D response to any R&D of the leader. For positive shocks, which firm’s 
R&D level will be greater will depend on the actual value of the demand shock and on 
spillover levels. In what follows, the leader is denoted by L and the follower by F. 
 
4.1 output stage 
 
The inverse linear demand function and marginal production cost functions are now 
p = a – b(qL + qF) + u  cL = A – L(xL + LxF) ≥ 0 cF = A – F(FxL + xF) ≥ 0 (32) 
while respective R&D costs are 
 L(xL) = xL)2/2  and  F(xF) = xF)2/2  (33) 
As the firms remain output market rivals, the output expressions in (5)
 27
 are amended to 
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The firms’ profits can be expressed as 
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while welfare is 
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4.2 Accommodation: R&D competition  (RURON) 
 
 The follower’s first-order condition is 
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that, from (32) and (34), can be expressed as 
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where u
FN
 is the follower’s marginal private return to R&D per unit of output. Non-strategic 
investment requires u
FN
 = F so the follower over (under) invests in R&D when 
                                                 
27
 As (34) is identical to (5) if the ‘leader’ is the representative firm and the follower is the (*) firm, it 
could be argued that the introduction of new notation is not required. This would be true if the 
simultaneous and sequential games were looked at in isolation. Later in this paper, however, it will be 
easier to compare the simultaneous and sequential games if the notation of each game is different. 
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2
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F
LL   , irrespective of the level of the demand shock. As the follower becomes 
relatively more efficient (F increases or L decreases), the more likely it is to over-invest in 
R&D to profit-shift from the leader for any spillover parameter. Using (34) in (38), the 
follower’s R&D reaction function is 
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so that the leader’s R&D is a strategic substitute (complement) for the follower’s R&D when 
(2F-LL)(2FF-L) < (>) 0, as the firms’ R&D reaction functions are downward (upward) 
sloping in R&D space.
28
  
 The leader’s first-order R&D condition is 
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 (40) 
Ex-post symmetry implies that L = F ≡  and L = F ≡ , so that given (32) and (34), (40) 
can be expressed as 
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where u
LN
 is the leader’s marginal return to R&D per unit of output. Non-strategic R&D 
investment requires  LNu  so the leader expects to over (under) invest in R&D when 
 )2(69)12( 2   b < (>) 0. When  < ½, the leader expects to over-invest in R&D for 
any unit R&D cost.
29
 On the other hand, when  > ½, the leader expects to under-invest in 
R&D, except for a narrow range of relatively high levels of R&D effectiveness where, given 
the second-order conditions, 
9
)2(6 2 
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b , at which it expects to over-invest in R&D. 
When R&D is highly effective (b low), the leader over-invests in R&D, even at relatively 
high effective spillovers, to reduce marginal production costs and shift profits from the 
follower. 
From (34), (40) and (41), the leader’s expected profit maximising R&D level is 
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so that from (42) and (39), the follower’s profit maximising R&D level is 
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which is positively related to the demand shock. Comparing leader and follower R&D levels, 
                                                 
28
 The follower’s second-order condition requires 9b - 2(2F-LL)2 > 0. 
29
 Given the stability conditions, 9b - 62(2-) > 0 when  < ½. 
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Given ex-post symmetry, then from (39), R&D is neither a strategic substitute nor 
complement when  = ½, so that in the absence of a shock (u = 0), R&D levels are identical as 
the Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium points coincide.
30,31
 For non-zero shocks, leader 
R&D will be greater (lower) than follower R&D for negative (positive) shocks, as the 
follower’s R&D reaction function shifts to the left (right) in R&D space. When   ½, the 
leader’s R&D exceeds that of the follower for non-positive demand shocks. This is for two 
reasons. Firstly, the leader’s Stackelberg point implies a greater level of R&D than at the 
Cournot equilibrium level. Secondly, the leader undertakes its R&D with an expected shock 
level of zero, while the follower’s R&D is based on the actual shock. For positive shocks, 
however, which R&D level dominates will depend on the size of the parameters of the model 
as the follower’s R&D reaction function shifts to the right in xL-xF space. In ‘jumping’, there is 
a trade-off between being a Stackelberg R&D leader and being unable to choose the ex-post 
profit maximising R&D level. If the shock is positive, the follower’s ex-post R&D level may 
exceed the leader’s ex-ante level given that it waits until the uncertainty is resolved. This is 
more likely the higher is the actual shock, as the leader’s choice is based on a zero shock. 
Using (34) and (42), the leader’s expected profit is 
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which is again positively related to demand shock volatility. The follower’s expected profit is 
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with the magnitude of the demand volatility effect different from that of the leader as, for the 
follower, both output and R&D are directly affected, while only the leader’s output is directly 
affected by the shock. From (45), (46) and the second-order conditions, increased volatility 
has a greater effect on the expected profits of the follower.  
Comparing (45) and (46),  
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second order conditions, follower R&D is always a strategic substitute (complement) for leader R&D 
when  < (>) ½. 
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so that given the second-order conditions, when  < ½ and for given unit R&D costs, there is 
an expected first (second) mover advantage when demand volatility is sufficiently low (high), 
given that demand volatility has a greater effect on the follower’s expected profits. 
Conversely, when  > ½, there is an expected second-mover advantage for any volatility level. 
While the leader’s R&D may be expected to be higher, the lower R&D expenditure and 
relatively large spillover gain of the follower, combined with the larger effect of demand 
volatility, will offset any advantage in choosing R&D before one’s rival. 
Using (42) and (43) in (34), and given (45) and (46), an expression for expected 
welfare can be derived. As this expression is relatively cumbersome and no simple conclusion 
can be drawn from it, it is omitted from this section.
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4.3 Accommodation: RJV formation (R&D co-operation) (RUROC) 
 
 The follower’s first-order R&D condition is 
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so that given (32) and (34), we can derive 
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Non-strategic R&D investment requires FLLFFFCu   21 so that, given the leader’s 
R&D, the follower will under-invest in R&D for all spillovers. Given (34) and (49), the 
follower’s joint-profit maximising R&D reaction function is 
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so that the leader’s R&D is a strategic substitute (complement) for that of the entrant’s R&D 
when 
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 The leader’s first-order R&D condition is now  
                                                 
32
 In Section 7, restrictions are imposed on the parameters of the model to enable simulation of the 
model in order to facilitate comparison of the different games. 
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 The follower’s second-order condition now requires 0)2(2)2(29 22  LLFFLLb  . 
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where the first term on the right-hand side of (51) is given by (40). Given (48), the expression 
in (51) can be reduced to  
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as the R&D reaction function effects are eliminated given the shape of the iso-profit curves 
when the firms form a RJV (see Figure 1).
34
 Ex-post symmetry implies that L = F ≡  and L 
= F ≡ , so that given (32), (33) and (34), (52) can be expressed as 
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Non-strategic R&D investment requires )1(21  
LLLC
u  so that the leader will expect 
to under-invest in R&D for any spillover level. Given (34) and (39), the leader’s expected joint 
profit maximising R&D level
35
 is 
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Substituting (54) into (50), the follower’s profit maximising R&D level is 
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which, again, is positively related to the demand shock. From (54) and (55), the follower’s 
R&D will be greater (lower) than that of the leader when the demand shock is positive 
(negative), though the leader expects them to be identical when undertaking its R&D 
investment. Using (54) and (55) in (34) and (35), the leader’s expected profit is 
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which is positively related to the volatility of demand. The follower’s expected profit is 
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where demand volatility again has a different effect on the follower’s profits given that the 
demand shock does not directly affect the leader’s R&D. Comparing (56) and (57), 
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34
 The shape of the iso-profit curves ensures that the Stackelberg equilibrium in the sequential R&D 
game is identical to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous R&D game. 
35
 The leader’s second-order R&D condition requires 0])1(189][)1(29[ 2222   bb . 
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The relationship between expected profit levels depends only on the level of spillovers and the 
relative ineffectiveness of R&D. Given the second-order conditions, then when  < 5/7, there 
will be an expected second-mover advantage, except for a narrow range of spillovers at which 
there is a first-mover advantage (see Figure 2).
36
 On the other hand, when  > 5/7, there will 
be an expected first-mover advantage for all levels of R&D effectiveness.
37
   
 Using (54) and (55) to derive the firms’ output levels in (34), and given (56) and (57), 
an expression for expected welfare can be derived. Again, this expression is relatively large 
and as no simple conclusion can be drawn, it is omitted from the analysis.
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4.4 Accommodation: R&D competition v RJV formation  (RURON v RUROC) 
 
 Looking firstly at R&D levels in (42) and (54), 
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Given the stability conditions, RJV R&D is greater than (equal to) competitive R&D when  > 
(=) ½, despite the possible over-investment when competing in R&D. For low spillovers ( < 
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for the leader and follower firms, respectively, so that 
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 . When  = ½, ex-post profits are identical in the 
absence of a shock as R&D levels are identical. For non-zero shocks, however, and given the second 
order conditions, the leader’s (follower’s) profits are higher if the demand shock is negative (positive) 
as the leader’s R&D is based on a shock of zero while the follower’s R&D reaction function moves to 
the left (right) in R&D space and its joint profit maximising R&D level is lower (higher) than the 
leader’s. When  < ½ then, the leader’s profits are higher for relatively large negative shocks, while the 
follower’s are higher for all other shocks. For large negative shocks, the leader’s R&D is higher than 
the follower’s as the follower’s R&D reaction function shifts to the left in R&D space. For the leader, 
the benefit of lower marginal production costs offsets higher R&D costs so that profits are higher.  
If ½ <  < 5/7 and 
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, leader profits are higher for all non-positive and relatively low positive 
demand shocks given the benefits of either lower marginal production costs, lower R&D costs or 
relatively large spillover gains from the follower, depending on the extent of the shock. For the 
follower, profits are higher when the shock is relatively high as its marginal production costs are 
relatively low and dominate any spillover benefit of the leader. On the other hand, if 



75
)1(6 32


b , 
leader profits are only higher for large negative shocks when its lower marginal production costs 
dominate. Finally, if  > 5/7, leader profits will only be higher for large negative shocks when its lower 
marginal production costs offset higher R&D costs. 
37
 There seems to be little economic intuition as to why a spillover level of 5/7 is a threshold that 
induces a leader’s expected profits to exceed those of a follower. 
38
 This expression will be simulated in Section 7 by imposing restrictions on the model parameters. 
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½), however, the {..} term in (59) is positive when  = 0 and increasing in the spillover so that 
competitive R&D exceeds RJV levels at these spillovers. 
For the follower, 
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For all spillovers, follower R&D under RJV formation tends to exceed that of R&D 
competition for all non-negative shocks and relatively low negative shocks, given likely over-
investment by a leader when competing in R&D. For relatively high negative demand shocks, 
follower R&D under RJV formation may be so low that its competitive level exceeds it. 
The more interesting comparison is between a leader’s expected profits, as this 
indicates the likelihood of the firms forming a RJV. From (45) and (56), 
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Given the second–order conditions, the expression on the right hand side of (61) is negative 
for all spillovers, so that for any level of demand volatility, a leader will expect a RJV to be 
more profitable than R&D competition when R&D levels are chosen sequentially.
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5. Accommodation: Simultaneous v sequential R&D investment 
 
 5.1 R&D investment: R&D Competition 
 
 Comparing expected R&D levels in (8), (21) and (42),  
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so that a R&D leader expects to undertake at least as high a R&D level relative to when the 
firms simultaneously choose their R&D. As the leader expects to have at least as high a R&D 
level as the follower, then 
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so a follower’s R&D level is also expected to exceed simultaneous R&D levels when  > ½. 
Comparing actual R&D levels in (7) and (21), R&D levels when both firms ‘wait’ are 
greater (lower) than when both ‘jump’ if the demand shock is positive (negative). The 
interesting question is how a leader’s R&D compares to where both firms ‘wait’.40 From (42) 
and (7),  
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When  = ½, R&D when both firms ‘wait’ is greater (lower) than a leader’s when the demand 
shock is positive (negative), with identical R&D levels if there is no shock. For all other 
spillovers, leader R&D will be higher for all non-positive shocks. For positive shocks, 
however, leader R&D will be greater for relatively low shocks, while R&D when ‘waiting’ 
will be higher for relatively large shocks. This is because the leader’s R&D choice is based on 
an expected shock of zero, while the R&D of ‘waiting’ firms is based on the actual shock. 
 
 5.2 R&D Investment: RJV formation (R&D co-operation) 
 
 Comparing expected R&D levels in (13), (26), (54) and (55), 
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u
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which are identical as the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg points coincide due to the shape of 
the iso-profit contours under RJV formation. Ex-post R&D investments will be directly 
affected by the shock which shifts the follower’s R&D reaction function, but not the leader’s. 
Comparing actual R&D levels in (26), (54), (55) and (12), ex-post R&D is greater (lower) than 
ex-ante levels if the actual shock is positive (negative), with R&D levels identical if there is no 
shock as ex-ante R&D levels are based on an expected shock of zero, whereas ex-post R&D is 
positively related to the shock. The interesting comparison, therefore, is between a follower 
and when both firms ‘wait’. From (55) and (12), 
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R&D levels when following or when both ‘wait’ are identical for any demand shock when  = 
½, as R&D is neither a strategic substitute nor complement at this spillover. When  < ½, 
R&D levels when ‘waiting’ are higher (lower) than those of a follower when the demand 
shock is negative (positive). On the other hand, when  > ½, ‘waiting’ leads to a higher 
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levels. Given this and (62), 
2
1
 when 















Nu
LN
u xx  . 
 23 
(lower) R&D level for positive (negative) demand shocks. To illustrate this, suppose that  < 
½ and there is a negative demand shock (u < 0). When both firms ‘wait’, the firms’ 
downward-sloping R&D reaction functions shift to the left in R&D space and R&D levels 
decrease by identical amounts. When R&D levels are chosen sequentially, however, only the 
follower’s R&D reaction function shifts to the left, as the leader’s R&D is consistent with a 
follower’s R&D reaction function based on an expected shock of zero. This leads to a 
relatively large fall in the follower’s R&D, as any reduction in total R&D in response to a 
negative shock is undertaken solely by the follower.  
 
 5.3 Expected profits: R&D competition 
 
In comparing expected profits, multiple Nash equilibria are possible in relation to the 
timing of R&D investment. As both firms have two possible actions, jump or wait, the firms’ 
payoff matrix is as follows: 
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When  = ½ and demand volatility is positive, a follower’s expected profit exceeds that of 
when ‘both jump’. On the other hand, when  ≠ ½, which expected profit level dominates will 
depend on the values of the various parameters of the model. Similarly, a comparison of a 
leader against ‘both wait’ in (45) and (9), shows that if )()( NLNu EE 
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where, if  = ½, expected profits when both ‘wait’ exceeds those of a leader when demand 
volatility is positive. For other spillover levels, which expected profit level dominates again 
depends on the value of model parameters. 
Due to the complexity of the expressions in (67) and (68), no simple conclusions can 
be drawn on the Nash equilibrium outcome. Given this, the expressions must be simulated by 
imposing restrictions on the parameters of the model. This is left until Section 7. 
 
 5.4 Expected Profit: RJV formation (R&D co-operation)  
 
The payoff matrix of the firms is now 
Table 2 
 Jump Wait 
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Comparing where both ‘jump’ to being a follower in (27) and (57), 
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while, from (56) and (14), comparing a leader to when ‘both wait’ implies that 
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Again, analysis of the expressions in (69) and (70), to determine the Nash equilibrium, 
requires imposing restrictions on the parameters of the model. This is left until Section 7. 
 
6. Sequential R&D: Activity prevention 
 
 If the leader wishes to prevent activity by the follower, it is assumed that there are 
two possible scenarios. The leader can choose its R&D investment so that it expects the 
follower not to produce, or it can ensure that the follower will never produce.
41
 In the former 
case, the leader invests in R&D so that the follower’s expected output level is zero. In the 
latter case, however, the leader undertakes its R&D investment to ensure that the follower’s 
output level is always zero, irrespective of the size of the demand shock, by assuming that the 
demand shock will be as large as possible.  
                                                 
41
 Ideally, this section would determine optimal activity-preventing behaviour for all possible levels of 
demand shock. As this is not the main focus of the paper, however, and given that the expected and 
highest value of the shock are known, only these two cases are analysed. 
 25 
R&D investment in the expected activity prevention case implies that the leader will 
only be a monopolist in the output market if the demand shock is non-positive. On the other 
hand, certain activity prevention implies that the leader will be a monopolist for any demand 
shock. Ex-post, however, the latter strategy will be sub-optimal for all shocks other than the 
largest possible shock, as the leader’s activity-preventing R&D level, and the consequent 
R&D costs, will be ‘too high’. The benefit of always being a monopolist, in terms of higher 
output market profits, must be compared to the higher R&D costs required to prevent activity 
for certain, especially if the actual shock is less than its maximum possible level. 
It is assumed that the firms always compete in R&D when the leader attempts to 
prevent activity by the follower as RJV formation is an unrealistic strategy for the leader.   
 
6.1 Output stage and follower R&D 
 
 If follower activity is unprofitable, the leader is a monopolist and its output is 
b
xu
q
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2
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while if activity is profitable, output levels are given by (34). The follower’s R&D investment 
incentive vis-à-vis the leader is unchanged from the entry accommodation case. Consequently, 
its R&D reaction function is given by (39). 
 
 6.2 Leader R&D: expected activity prevention 
 
 Substituting (39) into the follower’s output expression in (34), the leader chooses its 
R&D to ensure that E(q
F
) = 0. Given firm symmetry, which implies that L = F ≡  and L = 
F ≡ , and E(u) = 0, the leader’s R&D level is 
)21(
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which is undefined for   ½  as R&D is no longer a strategic substitute at these spillovers and 
activity prevention is not a viable strategy. The leader’s R&D is not a function of unit R&D 
costs as a fixed level of R&D must be undertaken to ensure expected activity prevention, 
irrespective of common unit R&D costs. As output levels in (34) are not directly affected by 
unit R&D costs, if the follower does not become active its R&D will be zero and so the 
leader’s output will also not be a function of unit R&D costs. From (72), the leader’s R&D is 
increasing in the effective spillover to counter-act an increasing gain to the follower for any 
level of R&D and ensure that activity is expected to be prevented. Substituting (72) into (39), 
the follower’s profit maximising R&D level is 
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Substituting (72) and (73) into (34), the follower’s ex-post profit maximising output level is 
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so that the leader will be a monopolist when the demand shock is non-positive, while the 
industry will be a duopoly if the shock is positive. 
Substituting (72) into (71) and substituting (72) and (73) into (34), we can derive the 
leader’s expected output. As the demand shock is uniformly distributed, its probability density 
function is 
u
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1)(   and the leader’s expected profit maximising output is 
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which is negatively related to the maximum demand shock. As the follower only produces 
output for positive demand shocks, the higher the maximum shock, the higher its expected 
output and the lower the expected output of the leader, given homogenous goods.  
Using 22 3u (see Section 2), the leader’s expected profit is 
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while, from (73) and (74), the follower’s is 
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 Using (74) and the leader’s output levels in (34) and (71) for non-positive and positive 
shocks, respectively, to derive the square of total industry output and using this, (76) and 
(76a), expected welfare is 
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6.3 Leader R&D: certain entry deterrence 
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 The leader now chooses its R&D to ensure that the follower never becomes active for 
any level of the demand shock by assuming that the demand shock will be at its highest level. 
The leader, therefore, is always an output market monopolist with its output given by (71). 
 Substituting (39) into the follower’s output expression in (34), the leader chooses its 
R&D to ensure that the follower’s ex-post output level (qF) is zero. Again given firm 
symmetry, this implies that 
)21( 




u
x LDuu    (78) 
which is again undefined for   ½ as activity prevention is not viable when the leader’s R&D 
is no longer a strategic substitute for that of the follower. Also, leader R&D is increasing the 
maximum shock level. Substituting (78) into (39), the follower’s profit maximising R&D is 
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so the follower never undertakes any R&D investment as uu  .
42 Given this, substituting (78) 
into (71) implies that the leader’s monopoly output level is 
 
)21(2
)21()1(2





b
uu
q LDuu    (80) 
which is increasing in the maximum level of the demand shock. The higher is the maximum 
shock, the greater the level of R&D required to ensure that the follower will never become 
active. As marginal production costs decrease due to higher R&D levels, the profit maximising 
output of the leader increases. Given (78) and (80), the leader’s expected profit is 
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As 
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)(  and 22 3u , the leader’s expected profit can be expressed as 
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 Using (82), 22 3u  and the expected value of the square of (80), expected welfare is 
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 6.4 Activity prevention: certain v expected  
 
From (72) and (78), the leader’s R&D is always higher when it attempts to prevent 
activity for certain as this R&D level is based on the highest possible shock. While certain 
                                                 
42
 The follower’s second-order condition requires 9b - 22(2-)2 > 0. 
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activity prevention ensures that the leader is always a monopolist in the output market, 
whether this is more profitable than expected activity prevention will depend on whether the 
expected benefits of being a monopolist for certain offset the higher R&D costs of ensuring 
that the follower will never become active. From (76) and (82), it can be shown that 
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where the denominator in (84) is positive given the second-order conditions. Given the 
complexity of the expression in (84), a comparison of expected profits in the activity 
prevention cases is left until Section 7 when restrictions are imposed on the various parameters 
of the model in order to facilitate simulation. Comparing expected welfare levels in (77) and 
(83) also leads to a complex outcome and comparison is again left until Section 7.  
 
7. Results 
 
 To compare the various cases, it is necessary to simulate the model by imposing 
restrictions on the parameters of the behavioural functions. For simplicity, b,  and  are 
normalised to unity, while ,  and 2 are exogenous parameters.43 As 0u  is required to 
ensure positive output, then 1u  , which puts a known and finite support on the upper bound 
of the probability distribution of the demand shock. As 
3
22 u , it must be the case that 
3
12  . This section mostly looks at where  = 2 to allows comparison of R&D, profit and 
welfare levels for most spillover levels.
 44
 Where possible, it also looks at where  = 1. 
 
7.1 R&D competition: Accommodation 
 
Looking at Figure 3, three Nash equilibria are possible when  < ½.45 For low 
spillover and volatility levels, both firms ‘jumping’ is a Nash equilibrium as investing before 
the demand shock is a dominant strategy for both firms. At such low spillovers, a firm that 
‘jumps’ expects to over-invest in R&D and shift profits from its rival through lower marginal 
production costs. For slightly higher, but still relatively low, levels of demand volatility, two 
Nash equilibria are possible where both firms either ‘jump’ or ‘wait’. Comparing expected 
                                                 
43
 As b =  = 1, the relative effectiveness of R&D is equivalent to the inverse of unit R&D costs. Also, 
given  = 1, effective spillovers are equivalent to .  
44
 Results are similar for other admissible values of unit R&D cost. 
45
 In Figure 3, ‘J’ denotes ‘jump’ while ‘W’ denotes ‘wait’. Given this, (J,J) and (W,W) refer to the 
Nash equilibria where both firms ‘jump’ and ‘wait’, respectively. On the other hand, (J,W) and (W,J) 
refer to where the firms sequentially choose R&D levels. 
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profits when  = 2 (see (9) and (22)), and given the second-order conditions, expected profits 
are higher when both firms wait, given the effect of demand volatility on expected profits. For 
sufficiently high levels of volatility, both firms ‘waiting’ is a unique Nash equilibrium. 
When  = 0.5, multiple Nash equilibria occur if there is no demand uncertainty (2 = 
0), underlining one of the findings of the previous chapter, as R&D is neither a strategic 
substitute nor strategic complement at this spillover and there is no first-mover advantage if 
the firms compete in R&D or form a RJV. For any positive level of demand uncertainty, 
however, both firms waiting is again a Nash equilibrium. 
When spillovers are relatively high ( > 0.5), three Nash equilibria are possible. For 
very low levels of demand volatility, a sequential R&D Nash equilibrium is possible, with the 
range of demand volatility at which this occurs increasing in the spillover. By waiting, each 
firm can benefit from its rival’s R&D through relatively high spillovers, without incurring the 
higher R&D costs. This incentive increases in the spillover. For all other levels of demand 
volatility, the Nash equilibrium is where both firms ‘wait’. If one firm waits, the other also 
waits as being a leader increases R&D costs to an extent that is not offset by an increase in 
revenue as the leader’s marginal production costs remain relatively close to the follower’s. 
 
 7.2 R&D Competition: Activity prevention 
 
 Using (84), it can be seen from Figure 4 that as 2 < 1/3, so that -0.577 <  < 0.577, 
expected profits from expecting to prevent activity exceed those of doing so for certain.
46
 
While the leader will always be a monopolist when preventing activity for certain, the R&D 
cost required to ensure this is too high to offset the increased output market profit and, hence, 
expected profit is lower.
47
 As spillovers increase, the demand volatility threshold at which 
certain prevention is expected to become more profitable is increasing due to the higher R&D 
required to prevent activity for certain. 
 When  = 1, certain prevention is expected to be more profitable for a small range of 
spillover and demand volatility levels (see Figure 5).
48
 Lower unit R&D costs imply that the 
increased R&D expenditure required to prevent activity for certain is more than offset by the 
increased output market profit and expected profits are higher.  
In general, for any spillover, the lower are unit R&D costs, the lower is the threshold 
level of demand volatility at which certain prevention is expected to become more profitable. 
                                                 
46
 This comparison can only be made for  < 0.5 as activity prevention is not viable for  ≥ 0.5.  
47
 As unit R&D costs increase, the result is generally identical, though the threshold level of demand 
volatility required to ensure that certain deterrence is expected to be more profitable is increasing. 
48
 It is possible to look at the activity prevention case for  = 1 as only the follower’s second-order 
R&D condition is required to be satisfied. The leader does not need to satisfy its own second-order 
R&D condition when it chooses its R&D to prevent follower activity.  
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Similarly, for any unit R&D cost, as the spillover increases, the increasing gain to the follower 
requires increased R&D expenditure in order to ensure certain prevention and this offsets the 
benefit of being an output market monopolist.  
 While the above analysis determines which activity-preventing strategy is preferable 
to a leader, such actions will only be undertaken if expected profits are positive. In Figure 6 
where 2 = 0.05, expected profits from expected activity prevention (see (76)) are negative for 
all spillovers for any  ≥ 2. Consequently, given the analysis of Figure 4, expected profits from 
certain prevention are also negative at these unit R&D cost levels so that neither activity-
preventing strategy will be undertaken. On the other hand, when  = 1, expected activity 
prevention is expected to be profitable for  ≤ 0.2, while from Figure 7, certain activity 
prevention (see (82)) is also expected to be profitable when  ≤ 0.2, but non-profitable for all 
spillovers when  ≥ 2. Comparing expected profit levels in Figure 8, certain prevention is 
expected to be more profitable when  ≤ 0.1, as the benefits of becoming a monopolist, in 
terms of higher output market profits and lower required R&D investment, dominate, with 
expected prevention dominating for all other relevant spillovers. 
Activity prevention, be it expected or certain, is only profitable when the leader’s 
R&D is highly effective ( is low) and spillovers are relatively low. As spillovers increase, 
then for a given demand variance and unit R&D cost, so must the leader’s R&D investment to 
ensure that the follower does not become active. As unit R&D costs increase, both activity 
prevention strategies become less profitable, while for given levels of unit R&D cost and 
spillovers, each strategy becomes less profitable as the volatility of demand increases. Higher 
volatility is equivalent to a higher maximum shock so that greater R&D investment is required 
in both activity prevention cases. As certain prevention requires higher R&D levels, the 
expected profit from this action will tend to be lower than that of expected prevention, except 
for very low levels of unit R&D cost at which the relatively higher R&D expenditure required 
is more than offset by the increased output market profits from becoming a monopolist.
49
 
 
7.3 R&D Competition: Accommodate or prevent activity? 
 
 As a leader can either accommodate or prevent activity by a follower, comparison of 
expected profits in both cases is required to determine what the leader will do. In the entry 
accommodation cases, (9), (22) and (45) show that expected profits are non-negative in each 
                                                 
49
 If R&D was costless or infinitely effective ( = 0), expected profits from certain activity prevention 
would always exceed those from expected prevention. Consequently, for any level of demand 
volatility, there is a threshold level of unit R&D cost at which expected prevention is expected to 
become more profitable for any level of spillover. 
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case. As a leader never seeks to prevent follower activity when ≥ 2, the Nash equilibrium at 
these unit R&D costs depends on spillovers and demand volatility as in Figure 3.    
 When  = 1, however, both expected and certain activity-prevention are expected to be 
profitable for low spillovers when 2 = 0.05 (see Figure 8). Unfortunately, given the leader’s 
second-order R&D condition when accommodating entry in the sequential R&D game, a 
comparison with activity prevention at the relevant spillovers is not possible for  = 1. 
Comparing the simultaneous R&D games of the accommodation case with the activity-
prevention cases in Figure 9, when  ≤ 0.1, both prevention cases are expected to be more 
profitable than accommodation, with expected prevention expected to be more profitable when 
 = 0.2. As expected profits are decreasing in demand volatility in the prevention cases, while 
increasing in volatility in the accommodation cases, this difference decreases as the demand 
shock becomes more volatile so there will be some threshold volatility level at which entry 
accommodation is expected to be more profitable than activity-prevention for all spillovers. 
  
 7.4 RJV formation (R&D co-operation) 
 
Again setting  = 2, Figure 10 shows that for almost all spillovers (0    0.94), the 
Nash equilibrium outcome is where both firms ‘wait’. For the remaining spillover levels, there 
are two possible Nash equilibria where both firms either ‘wait’ or ‘jump’.50 Comparing 
expected profit levels in (14) and (27), expected profits when both firms ‘wait’ exceed those 
from when both ‘jump’ for any positive level of demand volatility, spillover and unit R&D 
cost. This is due to the volatility of the demand shock having a greater effect on expected 
profits when both firms ‘wait’, as the output and R&D of the firms are directly affected by the 
demand shock, thereby ensuring that output and R&D decisions are ex-post optimal.  
  
 7.5 Compete in R&D or form RJV? 
 
 There are two main questions facing the firms. Firstly, when should they undertake 
their R&D investment and, secondly, should they compete in R&D or form a RJV? It was 
shown in the previous section that both firms will ‘wait’ if they form a RJV. If the firms 
compete in R&D, however, several Nash equilibria are possible depending on the level of 
spillovers and demand volatility. The question then is whether any of these Nash equilibria are 
expected to be more profitable than forming a RJV and ‘waiting’. 
                                                 
50
 Similar results follow for other admissible values of unit R&D cost. 
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From (17), a RJV is expected to be at least as profitable as R&D competition when 
both firms ‘wait’. Comparing where the firms ‘wait’ and form a RJV in (14) to where the 
firms ‘both jump’ and compete in R&D in (22), 
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so that ‘waiting’ and forming a RJV is expected to be more profitable for any unit R&D cost, 
spillover and demand volatility. 
 Given the above results, the interesting question is whether a firm will expect to make 
greater profits by ‘jumping’ and becoming a leader when the firms compete in R&D than from 
‘waiting’ and forming a RJV. Comparing (14) and (45),    LNuC EE 
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and which profit level dominates will depend on the sign of the {..} term on the left hand side 
and [9b-22(2-)(4-5)] on the right. When the second-order conditions are satisfied, both of 
these terms are positive for all spillovers when  ≥ 1, so that    LNuC EE 
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For all spillovers, unit R&D cost and volatility levels, expected profits when both 
firms ‘wait’ and form a RJV exceed those of ‘jumping’ and being a R&D leader when the 
firms compete in R&D (see Figure 11 when  = 2). This is due to the greater effect of demand 
volatility on expected profits when ‘waiting’. At low spillovers ( < ½), the relatively high 
R&D of a leader when competing in R&D raises R&D costs relative to the RJV to an extent 
that is not offset by lower marginal production costs and, hence, expected profits are lower. At 
high spillovers ( > ½), the benefits to waiting and free-riding on the relatively high R&D of 
the RJV partner will offset any advantage to being a leader and competing in R&D, given that 
R&D is a strategic complement at these spillovers. 
Another interesting question is whether being a R&D leader and preventing activity 
by the follower is expected to be more profitable than ‘waiting’ and forming a RJV. We 
already know that both types of activity-prevention are only expected to be profitable when 
unit R&D costs and spillovers are very low (see Figures 6 and 7). In Figure 12, where  = 1 
and 2 = 0.05, both activity-prevention case have higher expected profits for very low 
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spillover levels. When unit R&D costs are low, the expenditure required to prevent follower 
activity is relatively low and the benefits of being a monopolist, either for certain or in 
expectation, are large enough to offset this expenditure to the extent that overall expected 
profits are higher. As the level of demand volatility increases, the threshold spillover at which 
waiting and forming a RJV is expected to become more profitable is decreasing. In Figure 13 
where 2 = 0.3, certain prevention only dominates waiting and forming a RJV when  = 0, 
while the latter dominates expected prevention for all spillovers. As volatility increases, so too 
must the maximum level of the shock, thereby increasing the level of R&D required to prevent 
follower activity for certain, but also increasing the expected output of the follower in the 
expected prevention case which reduces the leader’s expected profits. 
 
7.6 Expected welfare: output exported 
 
While the firms’ decisions will be solely based on expected profits, from society’s 
point of view what matters is what maximises expected welfare. If this differs from the firms’ 
preference, there may be justification for government policy to increase expected welfare. 
If all output is exported, then welfare is equivalent to total industry profits. We know 
that when  ≥ 2, neither activity prevention strategy is expected to be profitable. We also know 
that RJV formation when both firms ‘wait’ is always expected to be more profitable than 
competing in R&D, and also compared to a RJV when both firms ‘jump’. On the other hand, 
both sequential R&D cases will have a second-mover advantage, depending on spillover 
levels, that may lead to total profits in the competitive R&D case being greater than those of 
RJV formation when both firms ‘wait’. 
In Figure 14 where  = 2 and 2 = 0.05, total industry profits are highest for all 
positive spillovers when the firms wait and form a RJV.
 51
 In this case, any second mover 
advantage in the sequential R&D competition case is not sufficient to ensure greater total 
industry profits. Increasing R&D costs or demand volatility leads to the same outcome (see 
Figures 15 and 16). 
On the other hand, when  < 2, preventing follower activity is expected to be 
profitable for both types of prevention at certain spillover ranges (see Figure 8). Unfortunately, 
comparing activity prevention to sequential R&D competition under accommodation is not 
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 In Figures 14-23, ‘seq. R&D comp’ refers to the case where R&D levels are chosen sequentially and 
the firms compete in R&D. Similarly, ‘seq R&D RJV’ denotes where R&D levels are chosen 
sequentially and the firms form a RJV. On the other hand, exp. prev. and cert. prev. denote the 
expected and certain activity prevention cases, respectively. 
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always possible for relevant spillover levels at these unit R&D costs.
52
  In Figure 17 where = 
1 and 2 = 0.05, if  ≤ 0.1, expected welfare is highest when follower activity is prevented for 
certain.
 
A combination of low spillovers and unit R&D costs makes such an action profitable 
for the leader and, as the output market is a monopoly, total industry profit is higher. This is 
also consistent with the firms’ incentives (see Figure 12). When  = 0.2, total industry profit is 
highest when the firms wait and form a RJV. On the other hand, it is in a leader’s interests to 
prevent activity in expectation (see Figure 12). Given this, there may be a role for government 
to subsidise RJV formation in order to align private and social incentives. For all other 
spillovers, total industry profit, and individual firm profit, is highest when the firms wait and 
form a RJV. 
Increasing demand volatility to 0.3 in Figure 18, waiting and RJV formation leads to 
highest expected welfare for all spillovers. When  = 0, however, a leader prefers to prevent 
activity for certain (see Figure 13) so that a subsidy for RJV formation may be required. For 
all positive spillovers, private and social incentives are aligned. 
 
7.7 Expected welfare: domestic consumption 
 
When output is consumed in its entirety in the economy of production, then consumer 
welfare will have an impact on overall welfare levels. Through the effect on output levels and, 
consequently, prices, if social and private incentives differ, there may again be a role for 
welfare improving government policy.  
From (18) and (31), a RJV is expected to give at least as high an expected welfare 
level as R&D competition when both firms ‘jump’ or ‘wait’, so the competitive R&D cases of 
these games can be omitted from this analysis. Comparing all remaining cases in Figure 19 
where  = 2 and 2 = 0.05, when  ≤ 0.4, expected welfare is highest when one firm ‘jumps’ 
and the firms compete in R&D. On the other hand, when  ≥ 0.5, expected welfare is highest 
when both firms ‘wait’ and form a RJV. For relatively low spillovers, the higher R&D of the 
sequential investment case leads to lower marginal production costs, which has the effect of 
reducing output prices and increasing consumer welfare. Combined with this, the positive 
effect of demand volatility on the follower’s expected profit will increase expected welfare 
above that of when both firms wait and form a RJV. On the other hand, for relatively high 
spillover levels, the benefits of higher R&D levels lead to higher expected welfare when both 
firms ‘wait’ and form a RJV. Given this, there may be a role for government to prevent RJV 
formation at relatively low spillovers and co-ordinate R&D investment when the firms 
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 In both sequential R&D competition and sequential RJV formation under accommodation, one of the 
second-order conditions is not satisfied for  ≤ 0.2 when  = 1, which is the spillover range at which 
activity prevention is profitable (see Figure 8). 
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compete in R&D.
53
 When the leader attempts to prevent the follower from becoming active, 
either in expectation or for certain, the R&D costs required to achieve these outcomes are so 
large that expected profits are negative (see Figures 6. and 7) even though welfare is positive 
through the consumer surplus effect. Such a welfare level, however, is always lower than any 
of the accommodation cases. Increasing unit R&D costs and demand volatility gives similar 
results (see Figures 20 and 21). 
An interesting situation emerges when unit R&D costs are reduced to  = 1 in Figure 
22.
54
 When  = 0, expected welfare is highest when a leader prevents follower activity for 
certain. The relatively high R&D required to ensure this reduces marginal production costs to 
such a level that prices are lower and consumer surplus rises, despite the leader being a 
monopolist in the output market. Low unit R&D costs ensure that this action is also expected 
to be most profitable (see Figure 12) so that such an outcome is likely. On the other hand, at 
slightly higher spillovers (0.1 ≤  ≤ 0.3), expected welfare is highest when follower activity is 
expected to be prevented, though this does not always lead to the highest profit (see Figure 
12). While certain prevention is expected to be most profitable at the lower end of this 
spillover range, over the entire range the relatively high R&D of the leader when expecting to 
prevent activity, leading to relatively low marginal production costs, combined with the fact 
that the output market may be a duopoly leads to higher expected welfare through an improved 
consumer surplus effect. Hence, a tax on R&D above a certain level may reduce the incentive 
to prevent activity for certain. On the other hand, when  = 0.3, RJV formation and waiting is 
most profitable (see Figure 12) but not socially desirable. In this case, policy may take an anti-
RJV slant in the form of taxation of R&D or simply outlawing their formation.  
For a narrow spillover range (0.4 ≤  ≤ 0.5), expected welfare is highest when firms 
sequentially choose their R&D and compete in R&D but this is not expected to be most 
profitable. Again, incentives to prevent RJV formation may be warranted. For the remaining 
spillovers ( ≥ 0.6), both firms waiting and forming a RJV is expected to be both profit and 
welfare maximising. The intuition for this is similar to previous cases.  
Increasing the level of demand volatility in Figure 23, where 2 = 0.3, outcomes are 
similar for all spillovers, except that sequential R&D competition and accommodation now 
leads to a higher expected welfare lever for a lower spillover range (0.3 ≤  ≤ 0.4). As demand 
volatility increases, then from the firms’ perspective, the benefit of waiting and forming a RJV 
dominates expected prevention over a greater spillover range than before (see Figure 13). 
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 This first part of this policy is similar to D’Apremont & Jacquemin, though it may occur for a lower 
spillover range, while the second part may require the presence of side-payments between firms. 
Note that the case where the firms compete in R&D and sequentially choose their R&D levels cannot 
be included here when  ≤ 0.2, as the second-order conditions are not satisfied at these spillovers when 
 = 1. A similar problem occurs for  = 0 when the firms form a RJV and sequentially choose R&D 
levels. 
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From a policy perspective, there is again a justification at relatively low spillovers to 
disincentivise RJV formation and to encourage expected activity prevention or sequential 
R&D competition, depending on which of these induces a greater level of expected welfare. 
 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 This paper seeks to determine the desirability of RJV formation in the presence of 
uncertain demand when firms benefit from R&D spillovers from rivals. The paper outlines a 
one-shot game where two, symmetric output-setting firms, who remain rivals in the output 
market, may compete or co-operate in R&D at the pre-output stage, but may also choose to 
undertake their R&D investment before any demand uncertainty is resolved, thereby possibly 
being a R&D leader. By becoming a R&D leader, R&D investment may be chosen to ensure 
that the follower does not become active in the industry, either in expectation or for certain.  
 If the firms compete in R&D, and a R&D leader accommodates the follower, then for 
given levels of unit R&D costs, multiple Nash equilibria are possible, depending on the level 
of spillovers and demand volatility. Over a large range of spillover and volatility levels, both 
firms waiting until the demand uncertainty is resolved is the unique Nash equilibrium 
outcome. At very low levels of spillovers and demand volatility, however, both firms 
‘jumping’ and investing in R&D before the demand uncertainty is resolved is the unique Nash 
equilibrium outcome. For slightly higher volatility levels, two Nash equilibria are possible 
where both firms simultaneously choose their R&D either before or after the demand 
uncertainty is resolved. Which equilibrium leads to greater expected profits for the firms will 
depend on the level of spillovers. At relatively high spillovers but low volatility levels, two 
Nash equilibria are possible where the firms sequentially choose their R&D levels. 
 When forming a RJV, both firms waiting until the demand uncertainty is resolved 
before undertaking their R&D investment is again the unique Nash equilibrium for most 
spillover and volatility levels. At very high spillover levels, however, two Nash equilibria can 
occur where the firms simultaneously choose their R&D, either before or after the demand 
shock occurs, though the latter is more profitable for the firms. 
 If a R&D leader seeks to prevent any activity by the follower, either in expectation or 
for certain, such an action is only expected to be profitable at very low levels of spillovers and 
unit R&D costs and exceeds that of simultaneous R&D investment.  
 If both firms wait or jump, then forming a RJV is expected to be at least as profitable 
as R&D competition. The most interesting question is whether R&D leadership when 
competing in R&D is expected to be more profitable than waiting and forming a RJV? If the 
leader accommodates the follower, the latter is the weakly preferred course of action of the 
firms for all levels of demand uncertainty. On the other hand, both activity-prevention cases 
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are expected to be more profitable than a ‘waiting’ RJV when unit R&D costs and spillovers 
are very low, with the difference negatively related to demand volatility. 
 If maximising expected welfare is the objective of the government, this may require a 
different action by the firms to that which is expected to be profit maximising. If output is 
exported in its entirety, there may be a role for government to subsidise RJV formation for 
relatively low levels of unit R&D costs, spillovers and demand volatility. On the other hand, if 
all output is consumed domestically, government policy could take the form of preventing 
RJV formation, taxing R&D expenditure that is incurred before any uncertainty is resolved or 
co-ordinating competitive R&D investment in conjunction with overseeing a system of side-
payments to ensure that total industry profits are equally shared. Which policy is required 
depends on unit R&D costs, spillovers and demand volatility. 
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Figure 1 – RJV formation ( < ½) 
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Figure 2: Expected RJV profits, leader v follower ( = b = 
1) 
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Figure 3 - Nash equilibria, R&D comp. ( = 2) 
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Figure 4 - Leader's expected profits - expected v certain prevention 
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Figure 5 - Leader's expected profits - expected v certain prevention 
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Figure 6: Leader's expected profits - expected prevention (2 = 
0.05) 
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Figure 7: Leader's expected profits - certain prevention (2 = 
0.05) 
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Figure 8: Leader's expected profit - expected v certain 
prevention ( = 1, 2 = 0.05) 
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Figure 9: Leader's expected profits, R&D comp ( = 1 , 2 = 0.05)  
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Figure 10: Nash equilibrium, RJV ( = 2) 
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Figure 11: R&D comp leader v 'waiting'RJV ( = 2) 
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Figure 12: Expected profit - waiting RJV v prevention ( = 1 , 2 = 
0.05) 
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Figure 13: Expected profits - waiting RJV v prevention ( =1 , 2 = 
0.3) 
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Figure 14: Expected Welfare - output exported ( = 2, 2 = 
0.05) 
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Figure 15: Expected Welfare - output exported ( = 5, 2 = 
0.05) 
RJV (both wait) 
seq. R&D comp 
seq. R&D RJV 
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Figure 16: Expected Welfare - output exported ( = 2, 2 = 
0.3) 
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Figure 17: Expected welfare - output exported ( = 1, 2 = 
0.05) 
RJV (both wait) 
seq. R&D comp 
seq. R&D RJV 
exp. prev. 
cert. prev. 
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Figure 18: Expected welfare - output exported ( = 1, 2 = 
0.3) 
RJV (both wait) 
seq. R&D comp 
seq. R&D RJV 
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Figure 19: Expected Welfare - domestic cons ( = 2 , 2 = 
0.05) 
RJV (both wait) 
RJV (both jump) 
seq. R&D comp 
seq. R&D RJV 
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Figure 20: Expected welfare - domestic cons ( = 5 , 2 = 
0.05) 
RJV (both wait) 
RJV (both jump) 
seq. R&D comp 
seq. R&D RJV 
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Figure 21: Expected welfare - domestic cons ( = 2 , 2 = 
0.3) 
RJV (both wait) 
RJV (both jump) 
seq. R&D comp 
seq. R&D RJV 
exp. prev. 
cert. prev. 
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Figure 22: Expected welfare - domestic cons ( = 1 , 2 = 
0.05) 
RJV (both wait) 
RJV (both jump) 
seq. R&D comp 
seq. R&D RJV 
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Figure 23: Expected Welfare - domestic cons ( = 1, 2 = 
0.3) 
RJV (both wait) 
RJV (both jump) 
seq. R&D comp 
seq. R&D RJV 
exp. prev. 
cert. prev. 
